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STATEMENT OF IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF
AMICI CURIAE
The statement of identity and interest of amici are set forth in the
Motion for Leave to File that accompanies this brief.
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Although this Court in State v. Bassett, 192 Wn.2d 67, 428 P.3d 343
(2018), categorically eliminated mandatory life-without-parole sentences
for juveniles, it did not address indeterminate sentences under RCW
10.95.030. Unless the child is under 16 when the offense is committed, the
sentencing court remains free to set the minimum term of years at anywhere
between 25 years to something short of life. What this upper limit (de facto
life) is remains undecided. But regardless of the minimum term of years set
by the sentencing court, because there is no guarantee of release once that
minimum term is served, a child sentenced under RCW 10.95.030 may still
die in prison.
When a sentencing court sets the minimum term, it must determine
whether the child is “the rare juvenile offender” who is “irreparabl[y]
corrupt[ ].” Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 480, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L.
Ed. 2d 407 (2012). Two problems immediately present themselves. First,
how is the court to determine whether a child—who had the physiological
and biological characteristics of youth at the time of the offense—does not
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have the capacity to change? Social science suggests that it is extremely
difficult to identify “the rarest of children[ ] . . . whose crimes reflect
irreparable corruption.” Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 726, 193
L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016), as revised (Jan. 27, 2016). This situation presents an
insurmountable risk of error.
Second, the juvenile bears the entire risk of any error the court might
make. If the sentencing court believes that the child whom it is sentencing
is capable of change, the sentencing court can set the minimum at 25 years.
If the court gets it wrong and the child turns out to be one of the few who
actually is incorrigible, the Indeterminate Sentence Review Board (ISRB)
will have the facts before it and can prevent that person from being released.
But if the court erroneously decides that the child is incorrigible and sets
the minimum sentence at 48 years, the child has no reprieve. Although he
could have been rehabilitated, he will never get a chance to be a productive
member of society. A sentence of that length does not advance legitimate
penological objectives. In addition, society misses out on someone who
would have become a contributing member if given a meaningful
opportunity for release.
This Court properly constrains sentencing courts’ discretion, based
on the constitution, within the limits set by the legislature. See Bassett, 192
Wn.2d at 91. As detailed below, sentencing courts are only giving the
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minimum of 25 years when they have no discretion because the child was
under 16 at the time of the offense; when courts have discretion, they are
generally giving high-range minimum terms short of actual life—or what
might be deemed de facto life—under the Miller-fix statute.

These

sentences ignore that the discretion sentencing courts exercise is in fact
constrained by Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176
L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010), Miller, Montgomery, and by this Court’s extra
protections given to juveniles under article I, section 14 of the Washington
Constitution, see Bassett, 192 Wn.2d at 73.
This Court should acknowledge that the high risk of error and the
asymmetric consequences of error require a sentencing court to set the
minimum term at the statutory minimum unless the State, by clear and
convincing evidence, establishes that a particular juvenile belongs in the
category of those rare youth who are incorrigible. Anything else flies in the
face of this Court’s jurisprudence that recognizes that children are different
and that Washington’s Constitution gives greater protection to children,
even when they are sentenced as adults.

3

ARGUMENT
I.

A sentencing court must set the minimum sentence at the bottom
of the Miller-fix statutory range unless the State proves by clear
and convincing evidence that the juvenile offender does not have
the hallmark features of youth.
Both the Supreme Court and this Court have held that juveniles

constitutionally and categorically differ from adult offenders for sentencing
purposes due to their lessened culpability and greater potential for reform.
As a result, the Supreme Court requires that courts give juvenile offenders
a meaningful opportunity for release. A meaningful opportunity for release
under the Washington Constitution means that courts must set the minimum
sentence under the Miller-fix statute at 25 years because (1) identification
of the rare incorrigible youth is extremely difficult and (2) the youth bears
the risk of the court’s error. Indeed, the ISRB fail-safe means that the rare
irredeemable youth would spend the rest of his life in prison no matter his
minimum sentence. Thus, for these compelling reasons, courts must set the
minimum sentence at the bottom of the Miller-fix statutory range unless the
State can prove by clear and convincing evidence that a juvenile does not
have the characteristics that define youth.
A. Courts must provide juvenile offenders with a meaningful
opportunity for release based on maturity and
rehabilitation.
This Court and the United States Supreme Court have held that
“children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of
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sentencing” because of their diminished culpability and potential for
reform. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471; Bassett, 192 Wn.2d at 81 (“children are
different” (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 481)). Juveniles differ from adults
in three major ways: their “‘lack of maturity and [ ] underdeveloped sense
of responsibility’ lead[ ] to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risktaking,” they are more vulnerable to negative peer pressure and “brutal or
dysfunctional” family situations, and their personality traits “are ‘less
fixed.’” Id. at 477-78 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70,
125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005)). As a result, the actions of juvenile
offenders are “less likely to be ‘evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].’” Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).
Long prison sentences do not serve the goals of sentencing for
children who have the “hallmark features” of youth. Miller, 567 U.S. at
477.

The “distinctive attributes” that separate children from adults

“diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences
on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes.” Id. at 472.
Because “‘[t]he heart of the retribution rationale’ relates to an offender's
blameworthiness, ‘the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as
with an adult.’” Id. (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 71). Juvenile offenders
are less deterred by harsh sentences because “they are less likely to take a
possible punishment into consideration when making decisions.” Graham,
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560 U.S. at 72. Incapacitation is also less compelling because courts must
believe “that the juvenile is incorrigible” for the length of the sentence,
whereas “incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.” Id. at 72–73 (internal
quotations omitted). Finally, imposing harsh sentences on juvenile
offenders does not serve the goal of rehabilitation because “the juvenile
justice system’s structure impedes rehabilitation, making that change more
likely to be regressive.” Aaron Sussman, The Paradox of Graham v. Florida
and the Juvenile Justice System, 37 Vt. L. Rev. 381, 405 (2012); see also
Graham, 560 U.S. at 79 (“In some prisons, moreover, the system itself
becomes complicit in the lack of development.”).
Sentencing courts must take those differences into account when
sentencing all juvenile offenders. Miller, 567 U.S. at 479; United States v.
Briones, No. 16-10150, 2019 WL 2943490, at *4 (9th Cir. July 9, 2019) (en
banc) (“even when terribly serious and depraved crimes are at issue”). The
requirement to treat juvenile offenders differently does not apply only to
life or de facto life sentences. In State v. Houston-Sconiers, this Court
applied the Eighth Amendment requirement to “treat children differently”
to juvenile offenders with 26- and 31-year sentences. 188 Wn.2d 1, 20, 391
P.3d 409 (2017). Indeed, the sentencing court must consider the “juvenile’s
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences,”
the effect of family and “peer pressures,” and “any factors suggesting that
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the juvenile might be successfully rehabilitated” anytime that it sentences a
juvenile offender. State v. Gilbert, 193 Wn.2d 169, 176, 438 P.3d 133
(2019).
Harsh sentences should be “uncommon” because nearly all
juveniles’ crimes “reflect[ ] unfortunate yet transient immaturity.” Miller,
567 U.S. at 479-80. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly said, “rare” is the
juvenile offender “whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”

Id.

(quoting Roper and Graham). In fact, a rule “forbid[s] psychiatrists from
diagnosing any patient under 18 as having antisocial personality disorder, a
disorder also referred to as psychopathy or sociopathy, and which is
characterized by callousness, cynicism, and contempt for the feelings,
rights, and suffering of others.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 573.
As the United States Supreme Court said in Graham v. Florida, the
Eighth Amendment requires courts to provide each juvenile offender with
a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity
and rehabilitation,” regardless of their crime. 560 U.S. 48, 79. The Court
did not define such an opportunity. Instead, Graham left it to the states, “in
the first instance, to explore the means and mechanisms for compliance.”
Id.

This State has already decided that the Washington Constitution

provides greater protection to juvenile offenders than the Eighth
Amendment, Bassett, 192 Wn.2d at 82; see also id. at 81 (Miller applies to
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de facto life without parole sentences). And this Court held that youth alone
can support a sentence below the statutory range. See State v. O’Dell, 183
Wn.2d 680, 696, 358 P.3d 359 (2015).
This Court has yet to address indeterminate sentences under RCW
10.95.030.
B. Sentencing courts should set the minimum sentence under
RCW 10.95.030 at 25 years to provide juvenile offenders a
“meaningful opportunity for release” under the
Washington Constitution.
Because the “hallmark features” of youth reduce the penological
justifications for imposing harsh sentences on juveniles and create a high
risk of error, sentences beyond the bottom of the Miller-fix statutory range
do not truly provide juveniles with a “meaningful opportunity to obtain
release.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 477; Graham, 560 U.S. at 79.
1. Sentencing courts cannot identify with certainty
those rare juveniles who cannot be rehabilitated
within 25 years.
Miller’s central inquiry “reorients the sentencing analysis to a
forward-looking assessment of the defendant’s capacity for change or
propensity for incorrigibility.” Briones, 2019 WL 2943490 at *6. But a
court cannot “with sufficient accuracy distinguish the [rare] incorrigible
juvenile offenders from the many that have the capacity for change.”
Graham, 560 U.S. at 77; Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735. As this Court
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acknowledged, “even expert psychologists have” difficulty “in determining
whether a [juvenile] is irreparably corrupt.” Bassett, 192 Wn.2d at 90; see
also Roper, 543 U.S. at 573 (referencing the rule against diagnosing those
under 18 with antisocial personality disorder). As a result, there is an
“unacceptable risk that children undeserving” of a life-equivalent or near
life-equivalent sentence “will receive one.” Bassett, 192 Wn.2d at 90. The
desire to incapacitate juvenile offenders “cannot override all other
considerations, lest the Eighth Amendment’s rule against disproportionate
sentences be a nullity.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 73.
A recent Ninth Circuit case demonstrates that a juvenile offender
can demonstrate the capacity for change within 25 years of his offense. In
Briones, the defendant was convicted and resentenced, post-Miller, to life
without parole for first degree felony murder, arson, assault, and witness
tampering. 2019 WL 2943490, at *2. The Ninth Circuit held that the
district court ran afoul of Miller because it failed to take into account the
evidence of “Briones’s efforts to rehabilitate himself” between the
“eighteen years that passed between the” two sentencing hearings. Id. at *7.
During that time, he “maintain[ed] a perfect disciplinary record, [ ] held a
job in food service; volunteered to speak with young inmates about how to
change their lives; completed his GED; and, in 1999,” married his highschool sweetheart and the mother of his daughter. Id. at *3.
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Nevertheless, Washington courts have been resentencing juvenile
offenders to life-equivalent or near life-equivalent terms so that the offender
can be released, at earliest, around the age of retirement, 65. Of the 22
juvenile offenders resentenced under Washington’s Miller-fix statute, only
seven will have an opportunity for release after serving 25 years in prison.
Importantly, each of the seven who received the bottom range minimum
sentence of 25 years were all under the age of 16 when they committed their
crimes; because they were each under 16, RCW 10.95.030(3)(a)(i)
mandated that the minimum term be set at 25 years. Stated differently, the
minimum, 25 years, has only been given when sentencing courts had no
discretion to set it any higher. When sentencing courts have had the
discretion to set it higher, they generally have set it much higher. Of those
who were between the ages of 16 and 18 when they committed their crimes,
upon resentencing, they received minimum sentences of 42, 1 50, 2 48, 3 38,4

1

State v. Backstrom, No. 97-1-01993-6 (Snohomish Cty. Sup. Ct. June 27, 2017).
State v. Boot, No. 95-1-00310-0 (Spokane Cty. Sup. Ct. Mar. 30, 2017).
3
State v. Delbosque, No. 93-1-00256-4 (Mason Cty. Sup. Ct. Nov. 23, 2016) (this case).
4
State v. Forrester, No. 1-25095 (1978) (Spokane Cty. Sup. Ct. Nov. 12, 2015).
2
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48, 5 46, 6 40, 7 189, 8 26, 9 125, 10 32, 11 and 35, 12 with three receiving LWOP.13
As a practical matter, their first opportunities for release will occur around
their retirement age. A chance for release at retirement age is not a
“meaningful opportunity.” The reason that we grant offenders release is so
that they will contribute to society, professionally and personally. It will be
difficult for an individual to reintegrate into society when he is eligible to
take his first job at the age that most Americans retire.
Given the extreme difficulty in distinguishing juvenile offenders
who are incorrigible at the time of sentencing from those whose crimes
reflect transient immaturity, there is a high risk of error in applying
disproportionately harsh sentences to juvenile offenders.

5

State v. Furman, No. 89-1-00304-8 (Kitsap Cty. Sup. Ct. Mar. 26, 2018).
State v. Haag, No. 94-1-00411-2 (Cowlitz Cty. Sup. Ct. Jan. 19, 2018).
7
State v. Leo, No. 98-1-03161-3 (Pierce Cty. Sup. Ct. Nov. 16, 2016).
8
The resentencing court in 2017 set a term of 189 years, even though this person was 14
when he committed the crimes. State v. Loukaitis, No. 96-1-00548-0 (Grant Cty. Sup. Ct.
Apr. 19, 2017).
9
State v. Hofstetter, No. 91-1-02993-0 (Pierce Cty. Sup. Ct. Oct. 18, 2013).
10
The initial resentencing court set a minimum term of 25 years for each of the 5 counts to
run consecutively, resulting in a minimum term of 125 years. State v. Phet, No. 98-103162-1 (Pierce Cty. Sup. Ct. Mar. 10, 2016). Mr. Phet’s Personal Restraint Petition was
stayed pending Bassett and Gilbert. That stay was lifted on May 21, 2019, but reresentencing has yet to occur.
11
State v. Skay, No. 95-1-01942-5 (Snohomish Cty. Sup. Ct. June 1, 2016).
12
State v. Thang, No. 98-1-00278-7 (Spokane Cty. Sup. Ct. Sept. 23, 2015).
13
State v. Ngoeung, No. 94-1-03719-8 (Pierce Cty. Sup. Ct. Jan. 23, 2015 & July 12, 2019);
State v. Stevenson, No. 87-1-00011-5 (Skamania Cty. Sup. Ct. Mar. 17, 2017); State v.
Bassett, No. 95-1-00415-9 (Grays Harbor Cty. Sup. Ct. Jan. 30, 2015). One of these was
Brian Bassett, and following this Court’s decision last year, his and the other two minimum
LWOP sentences became invalid. The point remains, however, that the resentencing
courts, exercising their discretion, set the minimum sentence at the maximum.
6
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2. The juvenile offender bears the entire risk of the
sentencing court’s error.
Under Washington’s indeterminate sentencing scheme, a lifewithout-parole sentence is always a possibility for a juvenile offender. Even
if the sentencing court sets the minimum sentence earlier than life, the
minimum sentence represents only the earliest point at which the offender
might be released. RCW 10.95.030(3)(f). There is no guarantee of release.
In fact, the ISRB will not release the individual at his minimum term if it
determines, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “it is more likely than
not that the person will commit new criminal law violations if released.” Id.
The ISRB can incarcerate the individual for another five years before it must
review his case again. Id.
The defendant bears the entire risk of any error the court makes in
setting the minimum sentence. If the court overestimates the juvenile
offender’s capacity for rehabilitation and sets the minimum sentence too
low, the ISRB will have the appropriate evidence before it and can simply
deny his release every five years until the end of his life. If the court
underestimates a juvenile’s capacity for rehabilitation, however, there is no
chance that the ISRB can correct that decision. Cf. Briones, 2019 WL
2943490, at *3. For example, if the court sets the minimum sentence at 48
years, a 17-year-old juvenile offender will be in prison until he is at least

12

65, of retirement age. As discussed above, the reason that this Court and
the Supreme Court held that juveniles should be sentenced differently is
because they can be rehabilitated and become productive, contributing
members of society.

See Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.

That purpose is

undermined if an offender has no option for release until most of his peers
are ending their professional lives.
C. The State must have the burden to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the child is incorrigible to justify a
minimum sentence over 25 years.
The defense need only prove an individual’s biological age to show
that he possesses the “hallmark features” of youth. See Miller, 567 U.S.
at 471. The differences between adults and juveniles that make juveniles
“special” for the purpose of sentencing are biological and physiological.
See, e.g., Briones, 2019 WL 2943490, at *4 n.3 (citing Graham and Miller).
As this Court observed in O’Dell, “parts of the brain involved in behavior
control continue to develop well into a person’s 20s.” 183 Wn.2d at 691–
92. The State then has the burden to show that the juvenile does not have
these biological and physiological characteristics or that, despite these
physiological characteristics, the juvenile is incapable of being rehabilitated
within 25 years.
The State must prove that the juvenile does not have the hallmarks
of youth by clear and convincing evidence. The general rule is that the State
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can prove facts supporting a sentence within a statutory range by a
preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 149
(1997) (per curiam). But in special or extreme circumstances, due process
requires that facts that “increase [a defendant’s] sentence [within a range]
must be based on clear and convincing evidence.” See Watts, 519 U.S. at
156 & n.2; see generally United States v. Jordan, 256 F.3d 922, 930 (9th
Cir. 2001). Here, special circumstances justify the higher burden: namely,
(1) the high risk of error given how difficult it is to predict whether a child
is capable of being rehabilitated and (2) the asymmetric consequences of
the error: the offender bears all of the risk of an incorrect decision. Unlike
the determinate federal scheme in Watts and Jordan, the Washington statute
has a fail-safe: the rare juvenile who cannot be rehabilitated will not be
released, presenting no risk to society. In the federal scheme, the offender
will be released based on the sentence that the court ultimately selects.
There is no fail-safe.
This holding is entirely consistent with Washington’s statutes and
case law.
The State argues that every youthful offender is not entitled to an
exceptional sentence because of O’Dell. State’s Supp. Br. at 2-3. But even
if O’Dell stood for that proposition, that proposition has no effect here. A
minimum sentence within the statutory range—25 years—is not an
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“exceptional sentence.” And, as discussed above, O’Dell actually supports
the Amici’s argument. If youth alone can justify an exceptional sentence
below the statutory range, O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d at 695-96 (overruling this
Court’s previous conclusion that “youth alone could not be a nonstatutory
mitigating factor under the SRA”); cf. id. at 693 n.10, then youth certainly
can justify a minimum sentence at the bottom of the statutory range.
The Amici’s position is also consistent with State v. Ramos, 187
Wn.2d 420, 429, 387 P.3d 650, as amended (Feb. 22, 2017). First, to the
extent that Ramos held that a juvenile offender has the burden of proof to
justify a sentence, that holding applies only to juveniles who seek sentences
below the statutory range. Here, a 25-year sentence is within the statutory
range. See RCW 10.95.030(3). Moreover, Ramos did not consider the
Washington Constitution, which provides greater protection in this context
than the United States Constitution. Ramos, 187 Wn.2d 420; see Bassett,
192 Wn.2d 67.
Nor should State v. Gregg, No. 77913-3-I, 2019 WL 2912599
(Wash. Ct. App. July 8, 2019), affect the Court’s decision here. The Gregg
defendant argued that the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
a juvenile’s youth was not a mitigating factor in order to justify a sentence
within the statutory range. Id. at *4-5. The Court of Appeals disagreed.
Like Ramos and O’Dell, Gregg is distinguishable. Gregg argued for a
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sentence below, not within, the statutory range. In addition, the court relied
heavily on the “Sentencing Reform Act of 1981,” which explicitly “places
the burden of proving mitigating factors on the defendant.” Id. at 1; see
RCW 9.94A.535(1). But the SRA does not apply to Mr. Delbosque’s
situation. The aggravated-murder statute, passed in 2014, is not part of the
Sentencing Reform Act. Compare RCW 9.94A, with RCW 10.95.030(3);
see also Second Substitute Senate Bill 5064, 63d Leg. Reg. Sess. (Wash.
2014). Thus, the SRA does not prevent the Amici’s proposed holding here.
II.

The Court of Appeals properly determined that the State did
not prove that Mr. Delbosque deserved a minimum sentence of
48 years by clear and convincing evidence.
The Court of Appeals properly remanded Mr. Delbosque’s sentence

for failing to comply with the Miller-fix statute in setting the minimum term
at 48 years. The “Miller holding” and a doctor’s testimony about Mr.
Delbosque’s brain was sufficient to establish that Mr. Delbosque had the
hallmarks of youth. As the doctor testified to the sentencing court: “the
major area in which youthfulness affects behavior is executive functioning
because of the youth’s underdeveloped frontal lobe.” State v. Delbosque, 6
Wn. App. 2d 407, 411, 430 P.3d 1153 (2018), as corrected (Dec. 11, 2018).
The State did not present clear and convincing evidence to show that
Mr. Delbosque did not have those biological characteristics or that, despite
those biological characteristics, Mr. Delbosque is incapable of being
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rehabilitated within a 25-year sentence after his offense. The State relied
only on the crime itself and an infraction that occurred 15 years into his
sentence to conclude that Mr. Delbosque was effectively “irreparabl[y]
corrupt[ ].” Id. at 418. As discussed in the Briones case, Miller “reorients
the sentencing analysis to a forward-looking assessment of the defendant’s
capacity for change or propensity for incorrigibility.” Briones, 2019 WL
2943490 at *6. And a minor infraction after 15 years of incarceration is
insufficient to prove that Mr. Delbosque is one of those rare juveniles who
could not be rehabilitated.
Thus, this Court should affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision and
remand for resentencing with a 25-year minimum sentence.
CONCLUSION
It is extremely difficult for sentencing courts to identify youth who
deserve sentences longer than 25 years, and the youth bears the entire risk
of the court’s error. These are compelling reasons to hold that courts must
set the minimum sentence at the bottom of RCW 10.95.030(3)’s range. The
“rare” incorrigible youth presents little to no risk to society because the
ISRB can always deny their release every five years for the rest of their
lives. Thus, this Court should hold that a sentencing court must always set
the minimum sentence at 25 years unless the State can prove by clear and
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convincing evidence that a particular juvenile does not have the “hallmark
features” of youth.
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